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I. INTRODUCTION
THE CRIMINAL INDICTMENT OF THE LAW FIRM OF MILBERG Weiss Bershad & Schul-
man, LLP ("Milberg Weiss")' has generated a great deal of commentary,2 the net
effect of which can be characterized by its heat, if not its light. The limited wattage
of public discussion doubtless is the result of conversations passing in the night;
many of those expressing opinions simply are addressing different issues-stroking,
as it were, different parts of the elephant. Not surprisingly, countering even a very
cogent comment about the size of the elephant's ears with a comment about the
length of its tail has little to commend it as a method of illumination.
At a minimum, we have seen in print Milberg Weiss-related comments about (i)
whether securities class action litigation is good or bad,3 (ii) whether entity liabil-
ity4 is good or bad,' (iii) whether manipulating threats of entity liability to achieve
individual convictions is good or bad,6 (iv) whether solicitation of plaintiffs in situ-
ations in which there are problems of the commons is good or bad,7 (vi) whether
partners in law firms realistically can be expected to monitor the conduct of other
lawyers in the firm, (vii) whether federal intrusion on the states' regulation of at-
torney conduct is desirable,' and (viii) the possibility for abuse presented by politi-
cally motivated prosecution.9 Although referring in passing to many of the other
issues presented, this article is dedicated largely to the constellation of questions
(the part of the elephant) surrounding the legitimacy and utility of the federal
imposition of criminal entity liability either as a surrogate for punishing individu-
1. For information about Milberg Weiss, see http://www.milbergweiss.com/firm/firm.aspx (last visited
June 29, 2007).
2. See infra notes 5-10.
3. See, e.g., 109th Cong., Statement on the Indictment of Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman (June 13,
2006), available at http://www.milbergweissjustice.com/docs/MilbergWeissCongressionalStatement.pdf, dis-
cussed infra text accompanying note 22; Julie Creswell, 4 From Congress Defend Indicted Law Firm, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 2006, at C4. For an insightful (and non-Milberg Weiss-related) analysis of the drawbacks of securities
fraud class action lawsuits, see Richard A. Booth, The End of Securities Fraud Class Actions, 29 REG. 46 (2006).
4. Throughout this article, the term entity liability is used interchangeably with "organizational liability"
or "corporate liability."
5. See, e.g., Kate Coscarelli, 2006 Sees Sharp Drop in Class Action Suits, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July
26, 2006, at SI (commenting on externalities of organization's indictment).
6. See Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective Waiver: Is a Half-
Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 155 (2006) (describing uses and abuses of requested
waivers).
7. See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social
Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2006); Richard A. Nagareda, Restitution, Rent Extrac-
tion, and Class Representatives: Implications of Incentive Awards, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1483, 1495 (2006) (examining
situations in which lawyers' incentives may align with social interests).
8. Editorial, Very Rough Justice, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2006, at A12 (commenting on the Department of
Justice's tactics in obtaining indictments); see also Gilles & Friedman, supra note 7, at 128 n.105 (commenting
on federal intrusion into state regulation of lawyers).
9. See Paul Braverman, Friends in Need: Milberg Defenders Challenge the Firm's Indictment, Left and Right,
AM. LAW., Aug. 2006, at 17 (commenting on perceptions of selective prosecution).
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als against whom criminal cases cannot be made or as a remedy for defects in
organizational structure or operation.
The succeeding discussion is organized as follows. Part II provides a brief over-
view of the factual background underlying the Milberg Weiss indictment and its
resulting public controversy. Part II also discusses the various counts of the Milberg
Weiss indictment, characterizing them as either "central" or "peripheral." It then
separately identifies the possible wrongdoers in the Milberg Weiss scenario and
posits that criminal entity liability in some circumstances is used as a surrogate
form of punishment for individuals against whom criminal cases cannot be made,
but who have more-or-less clearly engaged in non-criminal wrongdoing. Part III
describes the current posture of federal criminal entity liability, and examines the
linked issues of whether that liability should be determined by borrowing the law of
individual states, whether federal law should be structured according to the
"model" approach taken by many states, or whether a different uniform federal law
should be imposed. After taking the position that the federal government should
have a well thought-out uniform law, the Article turns toward considering the
shape of that law. Part IV addresses the general promises and perils of criminal
entity liability, particularly as compared to civil liability. The Article suggests that
criminal entity liability has a sometimes overlooked warning function that should
be more central to analysis. Part V seeks to overtly integrate imposition of criminal
entity liability with the accomplishment of the goals of criminal law. Ultimately,
the Article suggests that the most important step toward this integration is rethink-
ing the punishments for criminal entity liability.
II. THE MILBERG WEISS STORY
A. Factual Background
The indictment of Milberg Weiss in 2006 was the first high-profile filing of federal
criminal charges against an entity since 2002.1' In that earlier year, the criminal
conviction of Arthur Andersen LLP ("Arthur Andersen") led to substantial loss of
its prospective business and ultimately its dissolution, with the concomitant loss of
28,000 American jobs." In the interim, and in indicting Milberg Weiss, the United
States Department of Justice ("DOJ") was guided largely by the so-called "Thomp-
son Memorandum," which set out guidelines for charging corporations, including
10. See Brooke A. Masters, A Law Firm Under Pressure; Case Reopens Debate on Whether to Indict a Com-
pany, WASH. POST, May 25, 2006, at DI.
11. See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 107 (2006). Within a year, only 3,000 out of 85,000 Arthur Andersen employees
remained worldwide. Id. at 109; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing
and the Need to Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1701 (2006) (discussing
causes and consequences of Arthur Andersen's dissolution).
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the role and knowledge of management during the alleged wrongdoing, and its
cooperation during investigation.
At the time of its indictment, Milberg Weiss had for some twenty-five years been
positioned as one of the leading, and perhaps the leading, plaintiffs' firm in the
field of federal securities class-action litigation. 3 At an indistinct point during
those years, it attracted the attention of the DOJ, which launched a long-term in-
vestigation into the firm's conduct. 4 The first cooperating witness was coaxed into
the fold in 1999. I" Three years later, the law firm received its first subpoena. 6 Eve-
ryone appears to agree that, in the course of its investigation, the DOJ asked Mil-
berg Weiss to waive its attorney-client privilege so that the DOJ could gather
incriminating information about the conduct of individual partners. 7 No such
waiver was forthcoming." In May 2006, the investigation culminated in the crimi-
nal indictment of the entire firm and two of its managing partners, David J. Ber-
shad and Steven G. Schulman. 9 The precise allegations of the indictment are
discussed in Part II.B.2 °
Close on the heels of the indictment followed a great public hue and cry, during
which each of the issues raised in the Introduction of this article became the sub-
ject of some discussion. 2' Debate echoed as far as the halls of Congress-Congress-
man Charles B. Rangel and others very quickly issued a statement describing the
"attempt by the Bush Administration to accomplish by bullying and intimidation
what it has not been able to do by law-to end class action lawsuits, one of the few
tools remaining to safeguard the American consumer.1 22 Congressman Barney
Frank, a long time proponent of class actions, nonetheless rose to the defense of the
12. Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Larry Thompson to Heads of Dep't Components and U.S.
Att'ys, Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. (Jan. 20, 2003), reprinted in U.S. Att'y Manual, tit. 9, Crim.
Res. Manual, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm.
13. This claim is made on the Milberg Weiss website, www.milbergweiss.com, and is confirmed by the
findings reported in Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes
During the First Decade after the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1489, 1511, 1515 (2006); see also Stephen J. Choi
et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 901 (2005) [hereinafter Choi, Do Institutions Matter?] (commenting on association
of Milberg Weiss with institution-driven litigation); John D. Finnerty & Gautam Goswami, Determinants of the
Settlement Amount in Securities Fraud Class Action Litigation, 2 HASTINGs Bus. L.J. 453, 463-64 (2006) (com-
menting on the association of Milberg Weiss with above-average settlement amounts).





19. First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP, David J. Ber-
shad, Steven G. Schulman, Seymour M. Lazar, and Paul T. Seizer, CR 05-587(A)-DDP (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2004),
available at http:lfll.findlaw.comlnews.findlaw.comlwpldocslclssactnslusm/brg5I806bind.pdf [hereinafter
Indictment].
20. See infra text accompanying notes 30-35.
21. See supra notes 6-8.
22. 109th Cong., Statement on the Indictment of Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman (June 13, 2006),
available at http://www.m'dbergweissjustice.com/docs/MilbergWeissCongressionalStatement.pdf.
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Milberg Weiss prosecutors, noting that although he was "skeptical" about whether
the indictment was a good idea, he saw no evidence indicating that the DOJ had
"followed an excessively political course."23 The controversy focused attention on
the guidelines used by the DOJ in charging Milberg Weiss, leading to congressional
hearings and proposals in the fall and winter of 2006.24 As discussed below, 21 the
guidelines subsequently were revised. There has, however, been no move by the
DOJ to quash the Milberg Weiss indictment.
B. Initial Observations
1. The Alleged Crimes
Although nothing like a world record, the list of crimes alleged against Milberg
Weiss and its individual partners is impressively long. Further analysis is assisted by
roughly categorizing the numerous crimes charged as either "peripheral" or "cen-
tral." The "peripheral" category contains such alleged courses of conduct as con-
spiring to commit a "central" count, aiding and abetting a "central" count,
laundering the proceeds of a "central" count, destroying documents to impede the
investigation of a "central" count, etc. The "central" category contains those acts
that independently had a point. Both categories are described in more detail below.
The "peripheral" counts in the Milberg Weiss indictment actually comprise two
types of conduct. One type, referred to in this Article as "facilitation," really has no
legal, much less moral, significance apart from the "central" wrongdoing it ad-
vances, notwithstanding the sometimes pejorative terminology employed to de-
scribe it. Thus, a "conspiracy" to take flowers to the elderly in an assisted living
facility would not be a bad thing, nor would "abetting" such an act by growing the
flowers, nor would delivering the flowers through the United States mail or wires.
Obviously, facilitation charges sometimes are used to prosecute those who some-
how are involved in specific wrongdoing but who do not satisfy the tests that have
been legislatively devised. In other words, they are catch-alls for situations in which
legislative imagination has failed. Catch-alls may not be a bad thing, but they
should be recognized for what they are: authorization of a prosecutorial version of
manifest destiny. As will be clarified below, the facilitation category thus seems to
have a great deal of spiritual overlap with the possibility of criminal entity liability,
at least as described by its detractors.26
23. Masters, supra note 10.
24. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act, S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007); Sarah Johnson, Senator Takes
on DOJ's Thompson Memo, CFO.coM, Sept. 14, 2006, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm17929239?f=-related; see
also "The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations": Hearing Before
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearing.cfm?id=2054.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 81-83.
26. See infra Part III.A.
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The second type of peripheral wrongdoing indeed is wrongful, though pointless,
apart from a more "central" wrongdoing to which it relates. Lying to a judge or
prosecution official and falsification of tax returns are examples of this type of
conduct. Past, real-life illustrations are provided by Martha Stewart's conviction for
lying and obstruction of justice, notwithstanding the fact that it never was shown
that she engaged in insider trading,27 as well as by notorious crime-lord Al
Capone's conviction for tax fraud, although not for his more colorful alleged
deeds." This category largely is composed of activities involving misrepresentation,
reminding us (as would our mothers) that there is nothing so bad that is not made
worse by lying about it.
Somewhat meatier, but probably harder to prove, are the "central" counts-the
basic bad acts that allegedly were the subject of conspiracy, cover-up, and so forth.
Interestingly, because Milberg Weiss was an organization of licensed professionals,
in many circumstances these acts also might be characterized as professionally un-
ethical. In fact, one easily can imagine an incentive to engage in an illegal cover-up
of activities that were "merely" unethical, though not in themselves illegal. As far as
the Milberg Weiss indictment was concerned, however, these bad acts indeed were
characterized as violating federal law.29
The central illegalities of which Milberg Weiss is accused include commercial
bribery, breaching the firm's fiduciary duty to the plaintiff classes the firm repre-
sented in various securities actions, making excess payments to the lead plaintiffs in
those actions, and paying witnesses for their testimony.3" If the allegations are true,
individual Milberg Weiss lawyers also congruently engaged in professional miscon-
duct by soliciting legal employment,3 sharing legal fees with non-lawyers,32 paying
witnesses, 3 accepting representations in which there were undisclosed conflicts
among clients,34 and failing to disclose conflicts between clients' interests and those
of the firm. 5
27. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart Saved! Insider Violations of Rule lOb-5 for Misrepresented
or Undisclosed Personal Facts, 65 MD. L. REV. 380 (2006); Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart
Case Tells Us about White Collar Criminal Law, 43 Hous. L. REV. 591, 607-11 (2006).
28. See Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 9, 37 n.142 (2005); Harry
Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135 (2004); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's
Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2005).
29. See Indictment, supra note 19.
30. Id.
31. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2002). This solicitation would have been both general
in nature and to have taken the form of soliciting plaintiffs to purchase specific securities for the purpose of
satisfying standing requirements.
32. Id. R. 5.4(a).
33. Id. R. 3.4(b).
34. Id. R. 1.7(a)(1).
35. Id. R. 1.7(a)(2).
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2. The Arguable Wrongdoers
Assuming the factual truth of the allegations in the indictment, it is easy to con-
clude that at least Messrs. Bershad and Schulman, the individual Milberg Weiss
lawyers charged, did something "wrong," both by personally engaging in "central"
bad acts and by personally engaging in the types of misrepresentation contem-
plated by the second class of "peripheral" acts. As management committee mem-
bers or otherwise, they each may also have personally facilitated the wrongdoing of
the other or of some unknown third person(s). The issue of whether the Milberg
Weiss entity and/or the unindicted partners therein were wrongdoers presents a
more interesting question. This question is different than whether that entity and
those partners could, under the present state of the law, be criminally charged.
Without violence to analysis we can assume that the prosecutors preparing the
indictment of Milberg Weiss did not act frivolously, and believed in good faith that
the elements of the alleged crimes could be established (particularly those involving
facilitation).36 After all, and as detailed below,37 federal criminal law currently em-
ploys principles of respondeat superior borrowed from the common law, and does
so more generously than is the custom of the states.38 Does this mean that the law
firm actually did something wrong? Of course not; law firms-be they professional
corporations, limited liability partnerships, limited liability companies or other-
wise-are fictional entities. They cannot do anything, much less something with
moral content. At best, speaking in terms either of organizational wrongdoing or
"corporate morality"39 is a shorthand way of conveying that something is amiss
about the way the organization was structured (by human beings) or operated
(again, by human beings). At worst, it is meaningless, and confusingly so.
The Milberg Weiss indictment is a poster-child for the confusion just described.
Presumably, if individual lawyers other than Messrs. Bershad and Schulman per-
sonally participated in the crimes alleged in the indictment, including personal
facilitation of other wrongdoing, they would have been charged accordingly.4" In
other words, the prosecuting lawyers must have believed that probable cause did
not exist with respect to the partners that were not individually named. Does this
mean that the unnamed partners really did nothing wrong? Of course not; it sim-
ply means that they either did nothing provable or did nothing criminally
chargeable.
36. Id. R. 3.8(a) (prohibiting prosecutors from filing criminal charges without a reasonable belief in the
existence of probable cause).
37. See infra Part III.A.
38. See Ainslie, supra note 11, at 119-20.
39. See Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, If Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We Identify a
Corporate Morality, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1645 (2002) (discussing various theories of corporate morality).
40. It is worth noting, however, that the Indictment, supra note 19, at 3-4, did allude to wrongdoing by
"Partner A," "Partner B," and Partner E," in addition to the alleged wrongdoing of Messrs. Bershad and
Schulman.
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We may well feel, of course, that the unindicted Milberg Weiss partners were
negligent in selecting or monitoring Messrs. Bershad and Schulman, and particu-
larly in allowing the individually named partners to assume significant manage-
ment roles. If so, we might also suspect that indicting and convicting the entity is a
justifiable, albeit indirect, method of punishing them. We nonetheless still might
have concerns about other reasons the entity may have been pursued, and would
not know which of our suspicions were correct. Moreover, to the extent that federal
prosecution simply imposes discipline for transgressions of professional responsi-
bility or for other matters of organizational structure and operation that tradition-
ally are the province of the states (by reason of both the traditional regulation of
the conduct of lawyers by the state4' and the "internal affairs" doctrine42), the Fed-
eralists in the audience might find cause for genuine alarm.43 To the extent that the
method is indirect and creates no clear guidelines for future conduct, fans of clear
thinking might also complain.
Before considering the subject of the perils and promise of entity liability either
generally or in the specific context of the Milberg Weiss prosecution, it is useful to
spend a bit more time contemplating the possible non-criminal failings of the
unindicted Milberg Weiss partners. We might start by inquiring into whether the
conduct of these partners would have given rise to individual civil liability to pri-
vate plaintiffs. Most problematic, of course, is the evident absence of private parties
who feel sufficiently aggrieved to bring any claim. Were such parties present, how-
ever, general principles of partnership law historically would have done the trick
with respect to imposing liability on all partners for the wrongdoing of fewer than
all. 4 Fairly recent widespread conferral of the benefits of limited liability, however,
clearly signals that, so far as state legislatures are concerned, individual liability to
private parties must be based on individual bad acts, for which individual breaches
of duty must be established.45 These breaches are not evident from the facts alleged
in the Milberg Weiss indictment.
The typical rules adopted by the various state supreme courts for governance of
state-licensed lawyers contemplate that a partner's simple failure to assure that a
law firm has in place reasonable safeguards against professional misconduct by
others is itself a form of misconduct.46 The wrongfulness of the actual conduct of
41. See MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 30-31 (7th ed. 2005).
42. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUD-
ING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 199-200 (9th ed. 2005).
43. See generally RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987) (describing federalism and
the need to adhere to its principles). In the context of federalism and corporate law, see, e.g., Renee M. Jones,
Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625 (2004); Donald C.
Langevoort, Federalism in Corporate/Securities Law: Reflections on Delaware, California, and State Regulation of
Insider Trading, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 879 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate
Law, REG., Spring 2003, at 26.
44. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 14-15 (1916).
45. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 306(c) (1997); see also UNIP. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 303 (1996).
46. See MODEL RULES OF PROP'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2002). This section provides as follows:
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the unnamed Milberg Weiss partners is neither established nor foreclosed merely
by reciting this standard, but it is worth noting that this articulation of public
policy exists. It is, however, limited to the context of law firms, and would not
automatically apply in other organizational contexts. In Part IV,47 it will be argued
that public recognition of this type of wrongfulness should be expanded. Were this
to transpire, it presumably would be good to give express notice of what is ex-
pected, and, if criminal consequences attach for non-compliance, to memorialize
the notice in criminal law.
At any rate, limited to the law firm context, the existence of certain structural
defects might be said to establish that, as a matter of public policy, there are no
innocent partners." It might even be said that the laxity of inactive partners facili-
tates wrongdoing. In the abstract defense of the inactive partners of active criminal
wrongdoers, it might be argued that where law firms have exceeded a certain size, it
simply becomes unrealistic and presumably uneconomic to expect each partner to
monitor the conduct of the others. 9 This doubtless is true, but misses the point
that the obligation imposed on law partners relates to firm structure rather than
personal supervision. If the argument then slips sideways into concern about indi-
vidual partners and their inability to bring about change, we basically are saying
that it is unrealistic to expect lawyers to turn down or resign lucrative partnerships
in large law firms over mere structural issues. If so, the proper response may be that
a little criminal liability could be just the thing to reverse the flow of realism."0
III. THE FEDERAL QUESTION
To understand what actually has, and perhaps what should have, happened to Mil-
berg Weiss, it is useful to consider the general state of federal law with respect to
A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses
comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
R. 5.3(a) provides to similar effect with respect to a partner's obligations vis a vis nonlawyers.
47. See infra Part IV.
48. In this Article, references to law firm "partners" include references to those with comparable manage-
rial authority in professional corporations, limited liability companies, etc.
49. The general occasion of argument on the issue of a law firm partner's duty to prevent misconduct by
others affords an opportunity to reflect on whether there is obvious social utility to increasingly large firms (a
question closely related to whether the existence of gigantic non-professional corporations is socially optimal).
Although Milberg Weiss was not a mega-firm, at the time of the indictment it had approximately 120-some
lawyers. Although some, if not all, of the unindicted Milberg Weiss partners may have lacked specific incrimi-
nating or otherwise liability-creating knowledge, this feat surely would have been more difficult in a firm of
more modest size. To the extent that any profession lays claim to the right to self-regulate, requiring the quid
pro quo of practice in a setting in which the scrutiny of one's organizational colleagues is practically feasible
seems a modest enough demand.
50. In fact, although the ethics rule in question has been on the books for quite some time, there seem to
have been few, if any, enforcement actions brought involving large law firms. Were such actions forthcoming,
realistic expectations with respect to the future conduct of individual lawyers also might change.
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the criminal charging of entities. This is the subject of Part III.A. Part III.B com-
pares the federal approach with standards adopted by a number of the states and
confirms that the federal approach is more broadly permissive, presumably al-
lowing for more prosecutorial discretion. Part III.C explores whether the existence
of a different federal standard does or could intrude on the internal affairs5' of the
entities potentially subjected to this standard, a subject that could be of particular
concern for members of a profession that is generally regulated at the state level.
A. The Actual State of Federal Law
1. General Liability of Entities for the Commission of Federal Crimes
It is clear as a matter of constitutional law that Congress can pass criminal statutes
(hereafter "design" statutes) specifically regulating organizations engaging in partic-
ular activities (such as interstate common carriers) and providing that the acts of
their agents are to be considered the acts of the regulated organizations. 2 Design
statutes may either require the performance of specific duties or prohibit certain
conduct. In approving congressional action of this sort, the Supreme Court has
received,5" but been unimpressed by, arguments that imposing criminal liability on
corporations deprives innocent shareholders of their property without an opportu-
nity to be heard, 54 and that imposing liability as a matter of respondeat superior
deprives the entity itself of the presumption of innocence.5"
Congress also can and does pass statutes of a criminal nature, simply holding
liable "any person who" or "whoever" violates the relevant provisions.56 Some of
these statutes (hereafter "reference" statutes) provide definitions of "person" and
"whoever" that specifically refer to corporations and other types of organizations. 7
More often, the only definition that might apply is found in Title 1, Chapter 1,
Section 1 of the United States Code (hereafter "1:1:1"), which states that, for all
purposes under the Code, "unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the words
'person' and 'whoever' include corporations, companies, associations, firms, part-
nerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.""
In parsing the catch-all language of 1:1:1, commentators have argued that the
context of criminal prosecution generally should negate inclusion of organizations,
51. Ainslie, supra note 11, at 110-11; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Criminal Responsibility, in I
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 253-54 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal
Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1479-84 (1996).
52. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 496 (1909).
53. Id. at 492.
54. Id. at 494 (holding that public policy dictates that corporations be held liable for the tortious acts of an
authorized agent).
55. id. at 494- 97.
56. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(12) (Supp. 2006) (dealing with cyber terrorism); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b
(2000) (dealing with international terrorism).
57. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(12).
58. 1 U.S.C.A. § I (Supp. 2006).
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especially since at least some criminal statutes do specifically refer to them as being
subject to liability.59 As illustrated by the prosecution of Arthur Andersen, dis-
cussed immediately below, this is not a construction that has been embraced by
federal prosecutors or the federal judiciary.6"
2. The Arthur Andersen Prosecution as an Earlier Example of an Assertion of
Entity Liability for the Commission of Federal Crimes
On June 15, 2002, the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen was convicted of violat-
ing a federal obstruction of justice statute.6' The statute did not specify that organi-
zations were capable of violating it.6 ' The trial court, employing general standards
of respondeat superior, instructed the jury that Arthur Andersen could be found
guilty if any one of Arthur Andersen's United States employees acted knowingly
and with intent to violate the relevant statute, provided that the employee was
acting within the scope of employment.63 The court further instructed that an act
could be within the scope of employment even if contrary to instructions or firm
policy.6' Upon inquiry from the jury, the court responded that the jurors need not
agree on which employee possessed the requisite criminal intent. 6' The conviction
was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2004,66 but in 2005 the matter
was reversed by the Supreme Court and remanded on the basis of flawed jury
instructions.6 The flaws identified had nothing to do with the respondeat superior
aspects of the case.6" With continued prosecution of an effectively defunct entity
seeming to be overkill, the United States government did not choose to pursue the
matter further.69
3. Prosecutorial Discretion and the Thompson Memorandum
It is easy to understand why federal prosecutors might generally prefer to pursue
defendants who can breathe rather than those that cannot. As has been well ex-
plained elsewhere, criminal sanctions against organizations are, in effect, exclu-
sively economic, and there often are willing private plaintiffs attracted by deep
corporate pockets, as well as a variety of government agencies that may be available
59. See, e.g., Ainslie, supra note 11, at 117 n.41.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 62-70.
61. Verdict of the Jury, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, Criminal No. H-02-121 (S.D. Tex. June 15,
2002).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2000).
63. Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, Criminal No. H-02-121 (S.D. Tex.
June 6, 2002).
64. Id. at 6.
65. Arthur Andersen is Found Guilty of Obstructing Justice, THE ACCT., Jan. 21, 2002, at 1.
66. United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 302 (5th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
67. Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005).
68. Instead, they had to do with the failure of the instructions in describing the elements of a corrupt
persuasion. Id. at 706-08.
69. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, U.S. Ends Prosecution of Arthur Andersen, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2005, at DI.
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to seek civil economic penalties for the identical conduct.7" Moreover, since the
economic penalties of criminal entity prosecutions are borne by individuals (and in
the case of the prosecution of a large corporation, large numbers of individuals
who vote), bringing such prosecutions seems potentially politically costly, as well as
unnecessary.7' These points were rather vividly illustrated, of course, by what hap-
pened in the wake of the Arthur Andersen prosecution.72
Perhaps reluctant to admit what the public regarded as a mistake, and in any
event anxious to signal that organizational prosecutions were not dead, in 2003 the
federal government sought to outline the circumstances in which organizational
prosecutions were justified. This outline was contained in the Thompson Memo-
randum, named for its attributed author, Deputy Attorney General Larry D.
Thompson.73 The Thompson Memorandum contained a general discussion of the
pros and cons of criminal corporate prosecutions." The "many hands make light
work," but "too many cooks spoil the broth" nature of this general discussion was
neither controversial nor particularly enlightening." More eye-catching was a cata-
logue of factors to be taken into account when making a charging decision, includ-
ing whether the entity was willing to waive its attorney-client privilege and whether
it was paying legal fees for possibly guilty corporate agents.76 These factors seemed,
to many, to signal that the threat of criminal prosecution would be instrumentally
employed to reach individual corporate agents (not that the practice of trying to
get co-defendants to "roll over" on each other was exactly new).
The Thompson Memorandum guidelines were controversial well before the in-
dictment of Milberg Weiss.77 After the indictment they became more so." Congres-
sional hearings on the guidelines were held in the fall of 2006," and following
Senator Arlen Specter's introduction of corrective legislation, they were revised and
renamed. 0 The Thompson Memorandum thus has been replaced by the "McNulty
70. See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 23, 31, 33 (1997).
71. Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How
Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1336 (2001); Jeannie Nelson,
Comment, New Corporate Responsibility Law Increases Liabilities for Directors, Officers, and Attorneys, But Does
It Increase Protections for Investors?. 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1165, 1167-68 (2003).
72. Jeff Feeley, Arthur Andersen Settlement Approved for Enron Investors, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2007, at D2.
73. See Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Larry Thompson to Heads of Dep't Components and U.S.
Att'ys, Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. (Jan. 20, 2003), reprinted in U.S. Att'y Manual, tit. 9, Crim.
Res. Manual, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm.
74. id.
75. Id.
76. This latter aspect was deemed unconstitutional by the court in United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d
330, 366, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
77. See, e.g., George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 985,
988-91 (2005); John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM U. L. REV. 579, 625-26, 630
(2005) (describing the controversy surrounding the Thompson Memorandum).
78. Editorial, Milberg Mores, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2006, at A14.
79. See Johnson, supra note 24.
80. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act, S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007).
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Memorandum" (so called after its attributed author, Deputy Attorney General Paul
J. McNulty).8 The McNulty Memorandum prescribes, among other things, a pro-
cess requiring multiple approvals before a corporate waiver of the attorney-client
privilege can be sought. 2
4. The Corporate Sentencing Guidelines
Not particularly well integrated with the standards for federally imposed criminal
entity liability are the federal guidelines for the sanctions to be imposed once liabil-
ity is found. These guidelines provide that upper-level management's lack of in-
volvement in any organizational wrongdoing can mitigate a monetary penalty. 3
They also provide that a corporate"compliance" program-that is, one designed to
avoid constituent wrongdoing-can mitigate. 4
5. Summary
The general state of federal law with respect to criminal entity liability thus may be
summarized as broadly permissive. Entities may be charged under design statutes
or reference statutes, as well as under statutes that are silent (hereafter "silence"
statutes) on whether they are eligible defendants. This does not mean that federal
indictment of entities is frequent, particularly under silence statutes. Logically, this
state of affairs owes largely to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. This discre-
tion may be influenced by a perception of good organizational hygiene; good hy-
giene also can be considered by way of mitigation at the penalty phase.
B. Comparison with State Law
Federal laws obviously coexist with the mandates of the various states (as well as
the strictures of local jurisdictions and assorted foreign sovereigns). With respect to
some issues, because of case law development, more rigorous statutory drafting, or
otherwise, questions that are not well-answered by federal law have more clearly
thought-out answers in at least some states. The question of when organizations
should be subject to criminal liability is said to be one of them. 5
81. Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Paul J. McNulty to Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Att'ys,
Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/
2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf.
82. Id. at 9- 10. As of this writing, Senator Specter manifested his dissatisfaction with the McNulty Memo-
randum by again introducing corrective legislation. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act, S. 186, 110th
Cong. § 2(a)(c).
83. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "Carrot and Stick" Sentencing: Structuring Incentives for Organizational Defend-
ants, 3 FED. SENT'G REP. 115, 126 (1990) (describing multiplier approach).
84. Id.
85. See Ainslie, supra note 11, at 119-23.
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1. The Model Penal Code Approach: Something to Work With?
The provisions of section 2.07 of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code"
("MPC") have served as the basis for many state statues dealing with criminal entity
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (1985)
(1) A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if:
(a) the offense is a violation or the offense is defined by a statute other than the Code in which a
legislative purpose to impose liability on corporations plainly appears and the conduct is per-
formed by an agent of the corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of
his office or employment, except that if the law defining the offense designates the agents for
whose conduct the corporation is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accounta-
ble, such provisions shall apply; or
(b) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance
imposed on corporations by law; or
(c) the commission of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or reck-
lessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the
corporation within the scope of his office or employment.
(2) When absolute liability is imposed for the commission of an offense, a legislative purpose to
impose liability on a corporation shall be assumed, unless the contrary plainly appears.
(3) An unincorporated association may be convicted of the commission of an offense if:
(a) the offense is defined by a statute other than the Code that expressly provides for the liability
of such an association and the conduct is performed by an agent of the association acting in
behalf of the association within the scope of his office or employment, except that if the law
defining the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the association is accountable or
the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply; or
(b) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance
imposed on associations by law.
(4) As used in this Section:
(a) "corporation" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the
execution of a governmental program;
(b) "agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in
behalf of the corporation or association and, in the case of an unincorporated association, a
member of such association;
(c) "high managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or an unincorporated association,
or, in the case of a partnership, a partner, or any other agent of a corporation or association
having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the
policy of the corporation or association.
(5) In any prosecution of a corporation or an unincorporated association for the commission of an
offense included within the terms of Subsection (l)(a) or Subsection (3)(a) of this Section, other
than an offense for which absolute liability has been imposed, it shall be a defense if the defendant
proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsi-
bility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission. This
paragraph shall not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the
particular offense.
(6) (a) A person is legally accountable for any conduct he performs or causes to be performed in the
name of the corporation or an unincorporated association or in its behalf to the same extent as if
it were performed in his own name or behalf.
(b) Whenever a duty to act is imposed by law upon a corporation or an unincorporated associa-
tion, any agent of the corporation or association having primary responsibility for the discharge
of the duty is legally accountable for a reckless omission to perform the required act to the same
extent as if the duty were imposed by law directly upon himself.
(c) When a person is convicted of an offense by reason of his legal accountability for the conduct
of a corporation or an unincorporated association, he is subject to the sentence authorized by
law when a natural person is convicted of an offense of the grade and the degree involved.
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liability.s7 In fact, these provisions have been praised as representing a superior
approach to the loosey-goosey, respondeat superior-based approach employed at
the federal level.88 It has been urged either that Congress follow the MPC example
or that the federal judiciary adopt a uniform jury instruction to attain more-or-less
the same effect.8 9
The MPC can be characterized as generally restricting criminal entity liability, a
state of affairs justified on the grounds that such liability is largely unnecessary and
imposes costs on innocent shareholders and others.9" Its provisions can be summa-
rized as (a) permitting entity liability where it is clearly the subject of legislative
intent, and (b) otherwise limiting such liability (at least in the case of corpora-
tions)9 to situations in which "the commission of the offense was authorized, re-
quested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors
or by an upper-level managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within
the scope of his office or employment."92 Interestingly, the due diligence of supervi-
sory agents is made a matter of affirmative defense against assertions of entity lia-
bility based on some instances of legislative intent.93 The occasions when the
defense actually would be operational are somewhat less than clear. The relevant
subsection provides that the defense will not apply where the offense is one involv-
ing absolute liability (presumably having no mens rea requirement whatsoever) or
where it is plainly inconsistent with legislative purpose.94
The functioning of the provisions of the Model Penal Code with respect to legis-
latively-intended entity liability (category (a)) is worth contemplating. After all, if
legislative intent with respect to entity liability for a particular crime is manifest (as
it obviously is in the case of a design statute and evidently is in the case of a
reference statute), the first type of liability clearly is operational. Thus, statements
like the one in the MPC are superfluous, although nice as a matter of consistency."
Identifying a category defined by legislative intent did, however, give the drafters of
87. See Ainslie, supra note 11, at 120, 124.
88. See, e.g., id. at 120-23.
89. Id. at 122-23.
90. See Jeffrey S. Parker, Doctrine for Destruction: The Case of Corporate Criminal Liability, 17 MANAGERIAL
& DECISION ECON. 381, 387-88 (1996) (arguing that the availability of punitive sanctions in civil actions makes
criminal entity liability unnecessary); see also United States v. Sec. Nat'l Bank, 546 F.2d 492, 494 (2d Cir. 1976)
(holding that in cases of corporate criminal liability, "it is [the] shareholders, who in the end must bear the
financial burden consequent upon criminal liability"); Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Liability in
Texas, 47 TEX. L. REV. 60, 70 (1968) (describing how consumers also may bear the burden of corporate crimi-
nal liability).
91. Section 2.07 actually provides for different standards for unincorporated associations that generally
would result in more frequent liability; the majority of the states basing their statues on section 2.07 have opted
to eschew the differentiation. Ainslie, supra note 11, at 122 n.63.
92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(l)(c) (1962).
93. Id. § 2.07(5).
94. Id.
95. Moreover, the working of the due diligence defense would be downright mysterious if the matter was
not specifically addressed in the definition of the crime.
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the MPC an occasion to distinguish it from category (b) and to attach the defense
of managerial due diligence. This defense to entity liability does not exist under
federal criminal law,96 although it certainly is a matter that federal prosecutors may
consider in deciding whether to bring a charge97 and that judges may consider in
sentencing.9" Addition of such a federal defense presumably would reduce the cir-
cumstances in which criminal entity liability even arguably could result, and there-
fore would be expected to influence the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Compared to federal law, the MPC's treatment afforded where legislative intent
is not deemed clear with respect to entity coverage (category (b)) also reduces the
circumstances under which entity liability could be imposed. 99 It is important to
note, however, that this is not a matter of entirely avoiding entity liability in the
absence of manifest legislative intent. Rather, it is superimposing through criminal
law a notion of appropriate organizational structure and function that is relatively
uncontroversial. Who, after all, would argue that the board of directors or high
managerial agents should be ordering or recklessly tolerating criminal acts?' ° At
first blush, it is so uncontroversial that if it were federally employed, such a stan-
dard would be unlikely to be perceived as trespassing on any state's vision of how
its entities should be functioning. Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe both that
entity liability for Milberg Weiss might exist in this category due to the participa-
tion of both Messrs. Bershad and Schulman on the firm's management committee,
and that entity liability for Milberg Weiss has been anything but uncontroversial.
2. Wide of the Mark?
The MPC approach effectively renders organizations immune from liability where
their managers have been no worse than negligent, unless a legislature has mani-
fested an intent to the contrary.' A primary benefit claimed for the approach is
that it will generally reduce impacts on innocent shareholders, employees, etc., ab-
sent good, hard legislative thought. Presumably, at the state level, at least some of
that good hard thought is supposed to have been cheerfully contributed by the
drafters of the MPC as part of the model's package.
96. See supra notes 52-59 and text accompanying note 83.
97. See Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Paul J. McNulty to Heads of Dep't Components & U.S.
Att'ys, Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. 12-15 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
dag/speech/2006/mcnulty- memo.pdf.
98. See generally Coffee, Jr., supra note 83.
99. See, e.g., Ainslie, supra note 11, at 121.
100. It is interesting, however, to note that in some states, the board of directors can be immunized from
monetary liability to private parties for reckless breaches of the duty of care. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (1974); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (2005); HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 42, at 699
(stating that forty-three states have adopted similar statutes).
101. The "manifestation" is to consist of an imposition of absolute liability or other clear indication of
purpose. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.07(2), (5) (1962).
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In the instance of the federal government, however, criminal liability is strewn
hither and yon throughout a multitude of acts and statutes, many of which are
neither design nor reference statutes. °2 Even in the case of reference statutes, it is
possible that hard thought on the issue of entity liability simply has never occurred.
If so, it may be inauspicious to demand hard thought as a matter of retrofit. In
other words, the MPC approach might be a rather blunt tool to federally employ
on any kind of quick-fix basis. This is true because it evidently conflates the treat-
ment of design and reference statutes (thus tending to possible over-exclusion of
liability), might prematurely eliminate at least some types of desirable entity liabil-
ity by demanding initial prosecutorial showings as to matters within the knowledge
of management, and would largely eliminate entity liability in the event of "mere"
managerial negligence. Nonetheless, it might take decades for Congress to recon-
sider each of the existing laws under which criminal liability currently might be
imposed on entities and to decide whether such imposition indeed is warranted.
Such an endeavor is unlikely to be undertaken." 3 From this standpoint, a blunt
retrofit may be all that is possible.
Perhaps more important, encouraging a theoretical separation of the general
question of entity liability from particularized types of wrongdoing, and thus from
the question of what social consequences are to be discouraged or coerced in par-
ticular contexts, may be a shortsighted surrender of a powerful weapon. The idea
that entity liability could or should ever be dealt with in the abstract might be
extremely puzzling, were it not for the grand tradition of characterizing corpora-
tions (and now various forms of unincorporated associations) as fictional human
beings."4 The MPC approach seems to generally conceptualize organizations as
"good" fictional people if their management has been no worse than negligent, and
as "bad," punishment-worthy fictional people if their management has been reck-
less or worse. As noted above, this may be theoretically uncontroversial, but is
oddly discomfiting when the rubber hits the road of application in, say, the Milberg
Weiss case-ironically, a situation where it widely is suspected that prosecutors
were trying to employ entity liability to accomplish their particularized vision of
social goals. 5
102. See Stephanie Martz, Address Before Civil Justice Reform Group: Why Criminal Law Should Matter to
Business (May 23, 2006), in CHAMPION 42, July 2006, at 43-45 (stating that there are at least 4,000 crimes
defined by federal statute and at least 6,000 crimes defined by agency regulation).
103. This probably would be even more true were adoption of the MPC approach to take place, insofar as it
might prompt time-crunched legislators and others to believe that the question of criminal entity liability has
been definitively addressed.
104. Cf Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability
of Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1392 (1992) (describing anthropomorphism of
corporations).
105. Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735, 758-59 (2004).
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C. Congressional Power, Policy and Prudence
At present, the federal respondeat superior approach clearly diverges from the MPC
approach. It is interesting to think about whether the mere fact of divergence repre-
sents any sort of federal interference in organizational structuring. Such an inter-
ference certainly is theoretically possible. After all, state laws requiring less would
be effectively trumped if Congress adopted a rule holding entities liable for all
federal crimes committed by any agent absent a showing that the entity had a five
member board of directors that met for two hours every Wednesday. On the other
hand, where federal law formally deems management conduct irrelevant to the
basic question of criminal liability, as it does now, state organizational law arguably
maintains full sway. In other words, no matter how careful management might be,
there is no effect on federal criminal liability (except for some possible mitigation
of penalty), so managerial care will be dictated by other concerns. 6 These con-
cerns presumably will include the practical desirability of monitoring agent con-
duct to avoid civil and criminal violations of all types, but the steps taken would be
those devised by management and/or dictated by state law. From this standpoint,
any move away from the respondeat superior approach and toward a law in which
management conduct assumes formal significance risks theoretical intrusion on a
province traditionally reserved to the states. 107
1. Just Say "No" to Federal Encroachment
The question of-actually, the ruckus over-whether federal involvement in the
structuring of corporations' internal affairs is a good idea has been with us for a
long, long time.' 8 There has been so much said, in fact, that many readers already
will be equipped with a fully formed opinion on the subject. Those who firmly
believe that federal patty cakes should be kept in federal pockets might logically
prefer a continuation of the respondeat superior approach. If, however, fears of
prosecutorial abuse or the like prompted a desire for change, the logical candidates
for such change presumably would be (a) deference to the states by borrowing
individual state law, (b) invoking an impressionistic version of the law of most
states. 9 by analogy, or (c) abolishing federal criminal entity liability entirely.
106. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.07(2), (5).
107. See Part III.C.I, however, for a discussion of the prospective abolition of federal criminal entity
liability.
108. See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974) (describing the controversy and taking the position that federalization is appropriate); S. Samuel
Arsht, Reply to Professor Cary, 31 Bus. LAW. 1113 (1975) (describing the controversy and taking the position
that federalization is inappropriate); Bainbridge, supra note 43 (same); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the
Delaware Corporate Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969) (same).
109. In this article, the MPC approach stands as a surrogate for the typical state's laws.
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a. Borrowing
The notion of borrowing the laws of the individual states to fill gaps in federal law
is one that has been repeatedly addressed, sometimes awkwardly, by the federal
judiciary."' There indeed are circumstances in which federal gaps have been filled
by overt borrowing from the laws of specific states. For instance, when deciding
whether shareholder demand on the board of directors is required before initiation
of a derivative suit claiming rights under federal statutes, the Supreme Court has
turned to the laws of the states."' Borrowing is, however, generally undertaken in
the civil context, and even there deemed to be inappropriate when the question is
one of determining liability rather than establishing the availability of a remedy." 2
The reason it is eschewed in the determination-of-liability context is, presumably,
the undesirability of diversity in the definition of federal misconduct.' This self-
evidently is even more true in the case of criminal liability."4
There is no reason to expect a different result if one is considering a call for
congressional, rather than judicial, action. The possibility of borrowing state law on
entity liability is an obvious one, owing to the traditionally announced interest of
the states in the functioning of the fictional creatures for which they are responsi-
ble. Borrowing of this sort probably is not a good idea, even if Congress has the
power to state that the laws of the state in which the entity was formed should be
dispositive. As intimated above, the prospect of defining criminal liability in a non-
uniform manner is a traditional, and understandable, bugaboo."' Moreover, one
would expect that it would give gigantic and unseemly impetus toward incorpora-
tion in whichever state managed to pass the standard demanding the highest
prosecutorial showing."
6
When test-driving the possibility of a strict borrowing principle in the context of
Milberg Weiss, an additional issue crops up. Questions of how a state generally
factors such matters as organization structures, functioning of management, etc., in
imposing entity liability probably should be joined by the question of how that
110. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, State Answers to Federal Questions: The Common Law of Federal Securities
Regulation, 20 J. CORP. L. 155, 184-89 (1994).
111. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 98, 101 (1991) (referring to laws of individual states to
determine demand requirements for derivative actions brought under the Investment Company Act); see also
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477- 79 (1979) (using state law to determine ability of an investment company's
disinterested directors to elect termination of a derivative lawsuit brought under the Investment Company Act).
112. See Gabaldon, supra note 110, at 182, 187 (discussing factors considered in borrowing state law and
importance of the remedy versus liability distinction).
113. Id. at 183-84.
114. It is worth noting that the arguments are those generally recited by the federal judiciary, and ignoring
the insights of feminism, which generally call for attention to contextually meaningful specifics. See generally
Theresa A. Gabaldon, Feminism, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate and Securities Law, 5 TEx. J. WOMEN
& L. 1, 4-5, 19-20 (1995) (discussing feminist approaches and applying them in context of corporate and
securities law).
115. See supra notes 111-14.
116. This obviously is related to the traditional "race-to-the-bottom" concern. See infra note 130 and ac-
companying text.
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state wants its professional entities to function. Although this is something that the
states have ignored, insofar as criminal law is concerned," 7 if Congress really
wished to avoid trespass on state choices, it should be thorough in doing so. Man-
dating an inquiry into both state criminal entity liability and state professional
responsibility standards might result in some amount of intrastate contradiction;
one would assume, after all, that states would tend to require better than normal
organizational practices from their professionals."' Although any such contradic-
tion could be resolved by allowing the specific concerns of professional regulation
to take precedence, it is easy to see how the difficulties of analysis might proliferate.
It also is easy to appreciate the contextual reminder that a one-step inquiry into the
organizational standards of a particular state easily could omit aspects that might
be very important.
b. Analogy
Although borrowing individual state law to determine federal questions of entity
law seems both unlikely and ill-advised, relying on prevailing state law for relevant
analogies is more practically promising."9 In other words, corporate federalists
might feel that if federal law mirrored that of most state law with respect to the
importance of management's conduct in determining entity liability, state choices
about that conduct generally would be unaffected. 2 ° This analysis evidently would
prompt federal adoption of an approach based on the MPC. A brief reprise serves
to remind us of the argued drawbacks and virtues of such an approach. 2 ' The
MPC permits legislatures to manifest intent, but begs the question of what that
intent should be. Its default rules generally restrict criminal entity liability; its ad-
herents contend that this is appropriate because civil liability generally is adequate
and because criminal liability may affect innocent individuals. 22 In generally re-
stricting entity liability, however, the MPC conceptually severs it from the question
of how to achieve particular public goals.'23 Moreover and most certainly, if a deci-
sion were made to pattern federal law after the MPC, inquiry into any special stan-
dards applicable to members of a regulated profession would have no obvious or
117. Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck Between Bottom and Top: State Competition for Corporate Charters
in the Presence of Network Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681, 683-84 (2003) (describing the argument that states
focus on attracting businesses for incorporation when shaping their corporate law; and, therefore, cater to the
interests of management rather than the interests of shareholders or other social concerns).
118. See, e.g., S. High Dev., Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., 445 N.E.2d 1106 (Ohio 1983) (holding
that shareholders of professional corporations do not enjoy the protection of limited liability); cf. We're Assoc.
Co. v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, P.C., 480 N.E.2d 357 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that shareholders of professional
corporations enjoy the same limited liability as shareholders of ordinary business corporations).
119. See Gabaldon, supra note 110, at 193-95 (discussing the analogy approach).
120. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law,
65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 477 (1987).
121. See supra notes 101-14.
122. See supra notes 91, 101.
123. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(2) (1962).
VOL. 2 NO. 2 2007
MILBERG WEISS: OF STUDIED INDIFFERENCE AND DYING OF SHAME
easy fit.'24 Just as certainly, other important details might be missed. Nonetheless, if
one were wedded firmly to the minimization of federal intrusion on state choices
about entity management, the MPC approach would be something to seriously
consider.
c. Abolition of Federal Criminal Entity Liability
Corporate federalists presumably are federalists more generally, however, and actu-
ally might prefer the whole hog of entirely abolishing federal criminal entity liabil-
ity. "'25 This obviously would have the effect of at least a mild decrease of the federal
presence in American life. Those inclined to be federal abolitionists might still be
willing to contemplate calls for changes in criminal entity liability by individual
states.' 25 It would, for instance, be possible for any state to adopt a statute saying
that some irregularity in the structuring of one of its domestic corporations merits
entity criminal liability in and of itself. Admittedly, the adoption of such a statute
by any particular state seems unlikely due to fears of losing the "race to the bot-
tom."'27 Moreover, it initially would appear to fly in the face of the MPC, and
concurrently the approach of a number of states.'28 Indeed, since such a statute and
the MPC independently would move the instances of entity liability in opposite
directions, their goals would be directly opposed. Nonetheless, given sufficient in-
dication of legislative intent, the approaches would be formally consistent and
could co-exist in any jurisdiction.
2. Bigfoot's Not So Bad
Those who do not believe that American commerce will collapse if additional fed-
eralization of corporate law occurs may also think that it generally is appropriate
for the federal government to address regulatory lacunae in organizational con-
texts. 29 This seems particularly true when the issue is organizational criminal lia-
bility for federally-defined bad acts. This is simply another gap in federal law that
very clearly has not yet been thoughtfully filled. A congressional response probably
would be nice, and the bulk of this Article is devoted to suggesting its shape. 3 °
124. Section 2.07 of the Model Penal Code, governing entity liability, contains no provisions imposing
special standards for professional corporations or unincorporated associations. See id. § 2.07.
125. Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625,
633 (2004). These federalists may not prefer abolishing criminal entity liability with respect to specific, well
thought out and congressionally-defined crimes having truly national implications.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 843 (1993) (addressing the possibility of a "race to the bottom" in the context of takeover
statutes); see also supra text accompanying note 116 (addressing "race to the bottom" in the context of the need
for federalization).
128. See supra note 90.
129. Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REv. 588, 598 (2003).
130. As intimated just above, corporate federalists may regard the arguments presented as relating to a call
to action by individual states (race-to-the-bottom concerns notwithstanding).
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IV. THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF CRIMINAL ENTITY LIABILITY
The first step in redesigning the federal approach to criminal entity liability is to
consider just how such liability really differs from civil entity liability. Part IV.A
deals with the justifications of civil entity liability. Part IV.B examines how, if at all,
considerations differ in the criminal context.
A. Civil Entity Liability
The arguments for an entity's private liability under respondeat superior for the
actions of its agents are well-rehearsed... and relatively convincing. The legal ability
of the organization's management to direct the agents' actions equates to responsi-
bility for the results. Although civil liability translates to a reduction in value for
the organization's owners, we see the reduction as generally appropriate. After all,
whatever the benefits of the liability-creating activity were, the benefits have been
received and should be charged with their actual costs. This reckoning strikes us as
fair and encourages the belief that management's future economic decision-making
will be more accurate. This reasoning works relatively nicely as long as causal requi-
sites are observed and whatever damages are awarded are actual rather than
punitive."'
When civil liability is a matter not of private rights of action, but instead of civil
enforcement by some government agency, the calculation logically changes. Al-
though some penalties are reckoned by reference to losses caused (such as environ-
mental clean-up costs), others clearly are not. We nonetheless seem willing to
assume that the legislative scheme pursuant to which the penalty is imposed was
generally well-designed, and that the penalties themselves were well-thought-out
surrogates for actual societal losses. 3' This perception is buttressed wherever mon-
etary civil penalties are to be disbursed to a class of injured private individuals." 4 In
any event, the general concept of civil entity liability, by way of government en-
forcement or otherwise, is not any kind of lightning rod.
131. See, e.g., Rhett B. Franklin, Comment, Pouring New Wine Into an Old Bottle: A Recommendation for
Determining Liability of an Employer Under Respondeat Superior, 39 S.D. L. REV. 570 (1994) (discussing justifi-
cations for respondeat superior); see also Tracy E. Higgins, Limiting Respondeat Superior Liability: A Wolf in
Sheep's Clothing?, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1181 (1996) (discussing respondeat superior in context of human
rights).
132. It also is conceivable that the structure of analysis would remain the same if foreseeability require-
ments were substituted for causation requirements. Cf. Theresa A. Gabaldon, Causation, Courts, and Congress:
A Study of Contradiction in the Federal Securities Laws, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1027 (1990) (discussing role of cause
and possible substitutes).
133. But see Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law,
101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1802 (1992) (arguing for punitive civil penalties).
134. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 7246 (2000)), which is further discussed infra notes 196-205.
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B. Criminal Entity Liability
1. General
The prospect of imposing criminal penalties on entities resonates quite differ-
ently.'35 For one thing, we are not so accustomed to accepting economic analysis in
this sphere.'36 For another, and as noted above, there are those who contend that
civil entity liability is usually adequate to control organizational conduct."' In ad-
dition, it has been said that the only differences between civil and criminal liability
are the prospects for incarceration and/or shaming inherent in criminal liability. 3 '
Because entities cannot be incarcerated and cannot feel shame, " 9 it is also claimed
that imposing criminal liability rather than (or in addition to) civil liability largely
is pointless. 4 ° An exception (vividly illustrated by the experience of Arthur Ander-
sen and feared by some in the Milberg Weiss context) is acknowledged for those
convictions resulting in the more-or-less automatic loss of eligibility for govern-
ment-related business.''
Without a doubt, part of the differing resonance also has to do with the per-
ceived likelihood of sub rosa manipulations in the case of criminal entity liability.
In the civil context, if it is private rights of action we are talking about, we simply
expect the prospective plaintiffs to be motivated primarily by their own economic
calculations. If it is a matter of civil enforcement by a government agency such as
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), we expect application of rules
that are relatively specific and often particularly designed to shape organizational
conduct. On the other hand, since we have reasoned above that criminal liability
rarely need be invoked (because of its overlap with civil liability), when prosecutors
even threaten to do so they must be attempting to chill activities other than those
135. The same partially is true for civil penalties not designed to achieve compensatory goals. See John C.
Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done About
It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875 (1992) [hereinafter Coffee, Jr., Blurring] (responding to the contentions of Mann, supra
note 133).
136. But see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping
Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (recognizing historical law and economic approaches to analyzing criminal punish-
ment, and employing an economic analysis of criminal law as a preference-shaping policy).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
138. See Ainslie, supra note 11, at 110.
139. Notably, those making this argument are ignoring the rich literature on corporate shaming. For a brief
sampling of this literature, see, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A
Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999); Toni M. Massaro, Shame,
Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991); David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Shaming
Revisited: An Essay for Bill Klein, 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 105 (2005); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001) [hereinafter Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law); James Q. Whitman,
What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1998).
140. See, e.g., Ainslie, supra note 11, at 113-14; Lynch, supra note 70.
141. Arthur Andersen's conviction, of course, resulted in its loss of the ability to audit clients filing with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Appearance and practice before the Commission, 17 CFR
§ 201.102(e)(2) (2006), provides "any person who has been convicted of a felony ... shall be forthwith sus-
pended from appearing or practicing before the Commission." See infra notes 157-58 for the argument that
such losses should be more finely tuned and contextualized.
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that are the subject of the criminal statutes (such as the bringing of securities class
actions in the Milberg Weiss scenario) or to accomplish other goals (such as waiver
of the organization's attorney-client privilege in order to obtain evidence against
individual wrongdoers). Oddly, an attempt is made to give these arguments added
weight by intimating that these threats are highly effective (as well as dreadful)
because of the dire effect of criminal entity liability on innocent shareholders and
others. If taken to its logical conclusion, this generally contradicts the "criminal
prosecution is pointless" argument referred to above.'42 But what the heck.
Arguments about the manipulation of criminal entity liability seem to depend, at
least in part, on the perception that such liability is dreadful and unusual, and also
to assume that criminal liability otherwise has a non-instrumental point that is
somehow subverted when used for a different purpose. It is necessary, then, to
consider what the point of criminal entity liability is (or should be) and to examine
just why it is considered to be so draconian.
2. The Traditional Justifications of Criminal Liability
The traditionally advanced justifications of criminal liability include, of course, ret-
ribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterrence, with an occasional nod to
restitution.'43 Of these, restitution clearly is the least problematic in an entity con-
text.'44 It dovetails nicely with the justifications of civil entity liability; our primary
concern, then, should have to do with its possible overlap and putative lack of
necessity. Certainly, a proper criminal restitutionary remedy would make allowance
for a civil remedy, and vice versa.' In addition, a criminal restitutionary penalty
could be a nice supplement to civil liability where problems of the commons or the
like might prevent the private assertion of remedies.
Retribution poses different, and more numerous, concerns. '46 Because, as noted
above, entities cannot actually do anything, much less do something wrong, it
would seem at first that exacting retribution against an organization is not a logical
goal. Retribution is not, however, about logic; it is about public sentiment. It ar-
guably makes as much sense to salve public wounds in an organizational context as
142. See supra notes 133-36.
143. See, e.g., Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanc-
tions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1146, 1159, 1167 (1983). It is important to note that shaming and incarceration
merely are methods of achieving these goals, but are not regarded as goals in and of themselves.
144. See Michael Viano & Jenny R. Arnold, Corporate Criminal Liability, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 311, 325-26
(2006) (describing restitution as the primary remedy for criminal entity liability).
145. See id. at 326 (noting that restitution as a criminal penality, "is not appropriate when the organization
has independently compensated its victim"); see also Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate
Criminal Liability: Containing the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 952
(2005) (stating that some states have adopted "[corporate] deferred prosecution agreement[s]" that allow a
corporation to civilly resolve criminal investigations by agreeing to certain sanctions, including restitution, that
otherwise would have been imposed in a criminal prosecution).
146. Fisse, supra note 143, at 1167.
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in an individual one.'47 This suggests that retribution is a cognizable goal primarily
in high-profile contexts, which is somewhat perplexing.4 '
Just as troubling, to the extent that the criminal penalty imposed on an entity is
most likely a monetary one, or one with monetary consequences, 49 and unrelated
to actual benefits extracted at someone else's expense, retribution actually is ex-
tracted from the organization's owners, who themselves may be entirely innocent.
If the monetary consequences are severe, innocent employees, creditors, and con-
sumers may also be affected. It seems to be this prospect of innocents suffering
retribution that is most off-putting in the context of organizational criminal liabil-
ity. s Presumably, this suffering can be distinguished from the anguish and mone-
tary devastation that may be experienced by the family and friends of individual
criminal defendants on the basis that, in the individual context, the suffering of any
innocents is collateral to that of the criminal human defendant.' In the entity
context, the suffering of innocents seems to be the only human suffering that oc-
curs. Although this conceptualization disregards the possible human suffering of
sometimes culpable managers, it makes its point.
In any event, innocent suffering by owners, etc., also is a threatened byproduct of
the other (arguably loftier) goals of criminal liability, insofar as the spur to their
accomplishment is some form of monetary penalty. Take first the goal of incapaci-
tation as a method of avoiding further social harm.'52 Since, as earlier noted, a
fictional entity cannot be incarcerated or otherwise physically be restrained from
engaging in bad acts," 3 incapacitation would at first seem to require administration
of capital punishment. This presumably would take the form either of mandatory
dissolution or of monetary penalization so extreme as to drive the entity out of
business.'54
On second examination, however, there may be other possibilities. If the bad act
occurred in the context of utilization of a government benefit, disallowance of the
benefit effectively incapacitates the organization from future violations.' 5 Thus, in
147. Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 833, 834,
846 (2000).
148. This may be illustrated by some of the public reaction to suspicion that publicity played a role in the
securities fraud and obstruction prosecution of Martha Stewart. See Heminway, supra note 27 (addressing
perceived reasons for prosecution); see also Moohr, supra note 27 (same).
149. Disqualification from various government-sourced benefits are separately considered infra notes
209-11.
150. Richard S. Gruner, Just Punishment and Adequate Deterrence for Organizational Misconduct: Scaling
Economic Penalties Under the New Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 227 n.12 (1992).
151. See, e.g., Welsh S. White, A Deadly Dilemma: Choices by Attorneys Representing "Innocent" Capital De-
fendants, 102 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2033 (2004).
152. Steven S. Nemerson, Alcoholism, Intoxication, and the Criminal Law, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 393, 462
(1988).
153. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
154. E.g., George P. Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence: Implied Jurisdiction and Exaggerated Remedies in
Equity for Federal Agencies, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 11 (2007).
155. See Ainslie, supra note 11, at 115.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
THERESA A. GABALDON
the case of Arthur Andersen, automatic deprivation of the ability to practice before
the SEC' would prevent the firm from inadequately auditing clients in that con-
text, "'57 as well as from obstructing the investigation of any such inadequate audits
(the charge on which it actually was found guilty).' 8 If Arthur Andersen had some-
how managed to survive, one still might have feared the injury of clients without
business before the SEC, unless rehabilitation was achieved by the entity's near-
death experience.
Rehabilitation contemplates that someone who has wandered from the path of
righteousness can, after public identification as a criminal, be encouraged to return
to that path. 59 This would seem to work better in the case of individuals, as to
whom incarceration in a "correctional" facility and rehabilitative training are op-
tions, but still is not entirely illogical in the organizational context 6 ° Even though
organizations cannot walk righteous or non-righteous paths, one certainly can im-
agine management setting a new organizational course involving better controls
over individuals after the entity's criminal conviction. 6' Indeed, one assumes that
these rehabilitative consequences are one of the primary theoretic justifications for
imposing entity liability in addition to individual liability.
The goal of rehabilitation (which sounds of spiritual renewal) can converge with
that of deterring (presumably on cost-benefit or similar grounds) the particular
convict in question from committing further crimes.'62 Deterrence, however, has a
broader social goal of example-setting, effectively influencing others in addition to
the convict.'63 It is quite rational to think that an entity's criminal conviction may
have an effect on decision-making by the managers of other organizations. Here,
selection of targets on the basis of their public profile seems logical, if still some-
what distasteful. The bad flavor may even be enhanced in the entity context; after
all (and once again), the price of the deterrent effect is borne primarily by those we
characterize as innocents, and it may be a price in addition to the one extracted by
a well-working civil liability scheme. Where this is the case, of course, it also is
arguable that economic over-deterrence may occur.
156. See supra note 141.
157. Ironically, this was not the charge of which Arthur Andersen was convicted.
158. Of course, it also helped drive the entity out of business, harming innocent partners, employees, and
clients. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 11, at 1701 (describing reasons for Arthur Andersen's exit from the
industry).
159. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 891 (6th ed. 1991) (defining rehablitation as "[ilnvesting or clothing
again with some right, authority, or dignity" or "[rlestoring person or thing to a former capacity").
160. In fact, it has been suggested that rehabilitative effects can be more pronounced with respect to corpo-
rations. See Fisse, supra note 143, at 1159-60 (individuals react to stigma by becoming outlaws; corporations
react by reforming themselves).
161. One can also imagine that this would be facilitated if one of the penalties for an organizational crime
were replacement of management, which the market, if not the criminal law, might require.
162. John Lawrence Hill, A Utilitarian Theory of Duress, 84 IOWA L. REV. 275, 314 n.147 (1999).
163. Douglas R. Richmond, Products Liability: Corporate Successors and The Duty To Warn, 45 BAYLOR L.
REV. 535, 578 (1993).
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3. A Revisionist View
After all is said and done, if we indulge the modest assumption that government
regulators properly disavow any interest in the state of individual (much less corpo-
rate) souls, it is obvious that incarceration, rehabilitation, and deterrence are them-
selves instrumental goals designed to achieve improvements in social welfare. The
foregoing examination suggests that, in the entity context, such improvements pri-
marily are achieved by way of impact on management structures and practices. In
the case of retribution, social improvement looking toward a desired state of public
consciousness (i.e. a feeling of public security in the securities markets or in the
functioning of the court system) depends on how the public feels. This may turn
on a perception that entities will be managed differently in the future, but arguably
is effected simply by the satisfaction of vengeful urges.
Discussion thus far has not clearly identified nor dealt with the possible warning
function of criminal liability. Certainly, those agitating for the passage of "Megan's
laws"'64 believe that criminal convictions can brand wrongdoers, permitting the
public to take appropriate precautions and thus preventing future wrongdoing.
65
Perhaps criminal entity liability usefully could be conceived of as, at least in part,
an attempt to warn those who would deal with, invest in, or work for the entity
that all is not as it should be. Whether the immediate consequence is a simple
fleeing for the hills (that is, disinvolvement with the convicted entity), or ostenta-
tious reform in management structure or practices in order to maintain current
and prospective relationships, the ultimate result should be avoidance of future
wrongdoing and thus a presumed improvement in public welfare. Thus character-
ized, the dislocations experienced by current investors, etc., arguably are necessary
costs that may prevent larger future harms to themselves as well as others.
4. The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion
Given that it will never be possible for all crimes, in entity context or otherwise, to
be prosecuted, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with respect to charging is
inevitable.'66 However exercised, it is for instrumental goals, and it will impose
costs on innocents. The issue this presents is that imposition of costs on innocents
may take place for reasons that have not been legislatively or otherwise publicly
mandated. Although not mandated, the possibility of additional instrumental uses
of prosecutorial charging authority presumably cannot be unforeseen by any legis-
lative body that includes (or has tolerated inclusion of) entities within the group
capable of committing a specific crime. This does not mean, of course, that the
matter should not be revisited. At a minimum, this revisitation probably should
164. See, e.g., Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan's Laws, 42
HARV. j. ON LEGIS. 355 (2005).
165. Id. at 398 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003)).
166. Kenneth J. Melii, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669, 674.
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recognize that the most justifiable (or, at any rate, least controversial) uses of entity
liability will take place where the effect on innocents can be limited or truthfully
characterized as matters of voluntary choice. As discussed above, the Milberg Weiss
indictment might properly be viewed as a situation in which no partner was en-
tirely innocent.'67 Although there may have been pronounced spillover effects on
the employees and clients of the firm, it would be interesting to know to what
extent they could be characterized as voluntary reactions to the public warning
given by the indictment.'68
5. Composite Crime
Unexamined thus far is the idea that entity liability may consciously be used (and
even theoretically endorsed) as a method to address a situation in which individual
liability is not possible. This would be the case, for instance, where it was not
possible to show that a single individual possessed the requisite knowledge and
engaged in the requisite acts to satisfy all elements of a specified crime.'69 Imposing
liability on the basis of the composite knowledge and acts of all the organization's
agents then would seem to be a good way of discouraging organizations from
structuring themselves so as to deliberately compartmentalize knowledge, decision-
making authority, and execution.'7 ° Whether this is a useful analysis is one of the
subjects discussed below.' In any event, it is directly related to the notions that the
unindicted individual owners of Milberg Weiss nonetheless properly might be char-
acterized as wrongdoers and that those who deal with irresponsibly structured enti-
ties deserve warning of the true state of affairs.
V. OVERTLY INTEGRATING ENTITY LIABILITY AND SOCIAL GOALS
Part IV indicated that the abstract, generally cognizable goals of entity liability in-
volve salving the public's sense of injury, attracting the attention of entity managers
(both those of the entity accused and those of other organizations) to conditions
permitting individuals to engage in criminal behavior, and warning the public of
existing irregularities. The obvious undesirable cost is the suffering that may be
imposed on innocent owners who lose some portion of the value of their invest-
ment, with possible spillovers to employees, creditors, etc. This cost seems particu-
larly intolerable when entity liability is invoked to achieve some less-
straightforward goal, such as chilling the bringing of securities class action lawsuits,
which may be within the peculiar tastes of the charging official. This Part takes the
167. See supra Part II.B.2.
168. Cf Gilles & Friedman, supra note 7 (describing the loss of clients by Milberg Weiss).
169. See Ainslie, supra note 11, at III (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Criminal Responsibility, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 253-54 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983)).
170. H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Corporations for the Acts of Their Employees and
Agents, 41 Loy. L. REV. 279, 300-02 (1995).
171. See infra Part V.B.
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position that it would be beneficial to clearly and publicly acknowledge these goals
and then engage in some tweaking, both to facilitate their achievement and to min-
imize their costs, voluntary or otherwise.
A. Exposing Charging Considerations
The smallest tweak that one could imagine would involve superimposing some sort
of ritual public exposure and balancing of the considerations engaged in before a
prosecutorial assertion of entity liability takes place. For instance, the charging au-
thority could be required to list and disclose all the foreseeable consequences of a
contemplated assertion and then reveal the balancing analysis that it engaged in to
assure that the assertion truly is in the public interest. In the Milberg Weiss situa-
tion, one would hope that Debra Wong Yang or her superiors would have noted
that securities class actions might be deterred if the leading securities class action
law firm were indicted, as well as that threatening such an indictment might result
in the ability to gather additional evidence against individual wrongdoers. One
would also hope to see some frank acknowledgment that firm lawyers might be
expected to run down the ropes in an attempt to escape the leaky ship, that clients
might choose or be forced to take their business elsewhere, and so forth. However,
it must be noted that a proposal based on hope, rather than expectation, is less
than satisfying. Indeed, some might say that our experience in forcing federal agen-
cies to ruminate on the costs and benefits of new regulations generally has been less
than fulfilling. It might also be argued that requiring exposure of prosecutorial
reasoning would have the undesirable effect of signaling to some elements that
certain types of conduct are at less risk of prosecution.
Still, if the hoped-for listing really were forthcoming and the charging authorities
proceeded to meaningfully assess the balance, the Milberg Weiss indictment might
or might not have continued. The deterrence of securities class actions beyond the
deterrence achieved by federal litigation in the 1990s seems a perversion of legisla-
tive intent. 72 The threat of entity liability to achieve waiver of the attorney-client
privilege may have seemed like a dandy idea at the time, but if re-evaluated in the
light of subsequent public scrutiny, it probably has lost some of its attraction.'73
Since neither sinking law firms nor substantially impairing their ability to float
seems like an independently justifiable goal, what, then, would have justified entity
liability? There was, at the time, no palpable sense of public injury akin to that
following Arthur Andersen's alleged connivance in the Enron debacle, so retribu-
tion seems dubious. Moreover, layering on some sort of overt "public outcry" test
for criminal prosecution seems both unfair and ultimately detrimental to the pub-
lic's sense of confidence.
172. See Choi & Thompson, supra note 13 (discussing the purposes and general effect of the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1996); see also Choi et al., supra note 13 (same).
173. See supra Part III.A.3.
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There are, nonetheless, two more respectable consequences to be considered,
both in line with the abstract, generally cognizable goals described above. One, of
course, is the encouragement of Milberg Weiss management, in particular, and the
management of class action-handling law firms, in general, to scrutinize the oppor-
tunities of their members to engage in wrongdoing. This consideration, which even
provides a nice opportunity for a tip of the hat to professional responsibility con-
siderations, prompts one to think that defining Milberg Weiss's crimes in terms of
its structural shortcomings (and assuring that the punishment fits those crimes)
makes more sense than asserting that the fictional entity engaged in the various bad
acts (even those sounding in facilitation) referred to in the indictment. A general
redefinition of this sort might also reduce the opportunity for prosecutorial eccen-
tricity, 74 as is further described below.
The second respectable goal of the Milberg Weiss indictment appears to be
warning those who dealt or will deal with the firm of its possible rogue tendencies
(less colorfully, its structural deficiencies). Insofar as some of the alleged wrongdo-
ing was premised on breach of fiduciary duty, giving warning that the firm had no
effective method of preventing such breaches definitely seems to be a legitimate
goal. Although none of the allegations seem to have gone toward the menace of
employee interests, perhaps it was useful to warn employees that lax structures
might result in civil liability that could injure the firm's viability. This analysis also
prompts one to suspect, however, that the interests of third parties should be as
much at the heart of the issue as the interests of putatively innocent owners. This,
yet again, is a matter to be addressed below. 7
B. Rethinking Corporate Crimes
1. The Theoretical Heartland of Criminal Entity Liability
Interestingly enough, even those generally decrying the need for and/or desirability
of criminal entity liability tend, evidently as some sort of safety valve, to acknowl-
edge that it may not be quite so bad in at least one situation, which is symbolized,
albeit incompletely, by the MPC's default rule of imposing liability where a specific
criminal act is ordered or recklessly tolerated by the board or other high managerial
agent.'76 In this deviant corporate culture scenario,'77 endorsement of punishment
might, in the public eye, slip by on the basis of not much more than anthropomor-
phism. Naughty managers (who often can be identified and individually punished)
simply serve as the tainted corporate soul of the naughty, punishment-worthy en-
tity. This view theoretically would condone indictment of the Milberg Weiss entity
174. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
175. See infra text accompanying note 209.
176. See, e.g., Ainslie, supra note 11, at 115; Ann Foerschler, Comment, Corporate Criminal Intent: Toward a
Better Understanding of Corporate Misconduct, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1287, 1289 (1990).
177. A variant sometimes is known as the "tone at the top" problem.
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based on the fact of the high organizational placement of Messrs. Bershad and
Schulman (at least if no one is worried about selective prosecution).
Another instance in which corporate criminal liability seems to carry particular
appeal is the situation in which a criminal allegation can be mustered only on the
basis of the composite knowledge and actions of an entity's agents. 7 ' This is the
case where it simply cannot be proven that any single human being both possessed
the requisite knowledge and took the requisite action to satisfy the elements of the
crime.'79 In the case of composite crimes, anthropomorphism takes on an added
twist. Here, we may suspect that management actually and cannily structured the
enterprise so as to avoid concentrating knowledge and decision-making authority
in a single place; if not that, we fear that such a structure "just growed."'"" In the
latter instance, we presumably are worried about managerial neglect. Because we
do not know which scenario is correct, all that we can be sure of is that, at a
minimum, the entity's managers (and perhaps its owners) have not been suffi-
ciently vigilant. Then, reluctant to criminalize individual conduct amounting to
nothing more than mere white-collar lack of oversight, but still desperately worried
because something "bad" happened, we content ourselves with pretending that the
fictional human being has perpetrated the perceived wrong. In effect, we appear to
conclude from the opposing scenarios the sanctionable state of the corporate soul.
In either the corporate culture or composite crime situation, "punishing" the
entity, either by taking some of its worth or by detracting from its reputation,
presumably beneficially results in the indirect punishment of the actual wrongdo-
ers-managers-by operation of market forces.'' This punishment is, to be sure,
imprecise and unpredictable.'82 Where it occurs, it may be the result of the
prosecutorial whimsy and/or manipulation discussed above, and therefore may fail
to assure that like situations are treated in like fashion, offending our sense of
fairness and becoming a matter of arguable under-deterrence (unless the civil lia-
bility scheme is functioning perfectly).
Nonetheless, as thus described, corporate culture and composite crimes rather
clearly distill to crimes that occur where overseers have done wrong, either through
negligence or by design. Unless analysts really have been hopelessly confused by the
seductive traditional imagery of the entity as fictional human being (which is un-
likely), the belief that entity liability can be appropriate in this theoretical heartland
must signal that the believers regard managerial misconduct (including lack of dili-
gence) itself as a criminal matter (albeit one for which we do not choose to punish
managers directly). From this perspective, wrongdoing really did occur, whether or
not the elements of some other crime can be established. Presumably, telling the
178. See supra Part III.A.1.
179. See supra text accompanying note 45.
180. See HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN (1852).
181. Khanna, supra note 51, at 1495-96.
182. See id. (discussing various ways corporate criminal liability can effect corporate management).
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public that the wrongdoing has occurred also serves as an indicator that it may be a
continuing condition, permitting protective measures to be observed. 8
The straightforward thing to do, then, would be to somewhat more rigorously
identify situations of managerial shortcoming and set about redressing them. In
doing so, we should be realistic about the pressures that have thus far served to
confuse the area. Likely to be foremost among them is our reluctance to see manag-
ers (who happen to look a lot like some of us) marched off to jail for actions that
we probably can imagine ourselves being caught up in. Leaving their punishment
to indignant market forces reacting to entity penalization seems, well, just about
right, but for its unpredictability.
From this standpoint, imposing legal liability on entities rather than managers
probably is the only thing for which we can muster the will-though we presuma-
bly would like to see it happen more often, and not as the result of prosecutorial
discretion exercised for unarticulated goals. This seems to suggest the formulation
of entity crimes that can be more-or-less easily proven by reference to organiza-
tional charts and procedures, without any need to make complicated showings ei-
ther of composite mens rea or of precisely who did what. These specially
formulated crimes should be coupled with penalties that are appropriately designed
to attract market attention without unduly harming innocent owners, employees,
etc.
Thus imagined, a question obviously occurs as to why a newly clarified type of
misconduct should result in criminal, rather than civil sanctions. In contemplating
this question, it is helpful to think again about what have been called the only "real"
differences between criminal and civil liability: the prospects of incarceration and
shaming as methods of achieving improved social conditions. 4 Because in the case
of entity liability no one is going to jail, criminalizing managerial conduct logically
must have something to do with shaming the entity in the eyes of the market, or
actually shaming those human beings associated with the convicted entity." 5 The
correlation of this presumably would be manifest public enthusiasm about convey-
ing a very distinct message concerning the shameful nature of organizational struc-
tures and practices that either facilitate or fail to discourage wrongdoing.8 6
183. Wilson Meeks, Corporate and White-Collar Crime Enforcement: Should Regulation and Rehabilitation
Spell an End to Corporate Criminal Liability?, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 77, 88, 93 (2006).
184. See supra note 139. Claiming that there are only two distinctions overlooks the fact that criminal
conviction frequently carries the prospect of Lieligibility for government contracts and/or government benefits.
See supra note 141, infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
185. See generally Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, supra note 139.
186. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (explaining that people obey law because
of its perceived moral legitimacy, not because of its deterrent threat); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful"Mean
"Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193
(1991) (describing criminal law as a kind of moral education); see also Coffee, Jr., Blurring, supra note 135, at
1876 (discussing the difference between pricing conduct as a matter of civil law and prohibiting it as a matter
of corporate law).
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What we seem to be contemplating, then, is "branding" organizations (and, to
some extent, their human associates) when human management has behaved cul-
pably. The brand may warn away some who otherwise would deal with the entity,
or may even trigger some sort of mandatory loss of prospective business, particu-
larly in the case of a gatekeeper or other entity which traffics in government bene-
fits for which the entity becomes disqualified. This raises the possibility that an
entity might actually die of shame, as Arthur Andersen arguably did, but the avoid-
ance (if so desired) of this ultimate sanction is an issue better reserved for the
discussion of how best to fine tune entity penalties.
2. The Precise Elements of, and Defenses Against, Entity Crime
The most obvious elements of entity criminal liability would be as follow: (1) that a
foreseeable triggering event (including criminal activity by an entity agent or the
composite satisfaction of the elements of any crime) has occurred, and (2) that the
triggering event either has been intended to confer or has had the effect of confer-
ring a benefit on the entity. This is, in effect, not eye-poppingly different than the
respondeat superior approach to criminal liability invoked by the federal govern-
ment in both the Arthur Andersen and Milberg Weiss situations, although it would
have the advantage of being more clearly stated and thus more overtly threatening.
Novelty vis a vis federal law would inhere, however, in the specific articulation of a
defense, permitting a showing that management had taken reasonable action to
prevent the triggering event.'87
This type of defense would be similar to that allowed by the MPC approach in
the case of crimes as to which the legislature has manifested an intention of impos-
ing criminal entity liability (either by design or by reference).' As proposed, how-
ever, it also would operate in the sphere as to which legislative intent with respect
to criminal entity liability is not clear; in that category, under the MPC approach, a
showing that managerial shortcomings are more extreme than negligence is made
part of the state's affirmative case. 9
When compared to the existing state of federal law, formal availability of a de-
fense based on management's care presumably would go some distance toward as-
suaging concern that entity liability is draconian and erratic, perhaps prompting its
regular invocation. At the same time, prosecutors presumably would not bring
claims where it seemed likely that the defense could be shown, again assuaging at
least some of our concern with prosecutorial discretion. Where claims of entity
liability actually were made and sustained, they effectively would constitute a pen-
alty for management's (even negligent) shortcomings, without automatically ren-
187. A more novel defense might be based on a demonstration of some proportion of innocent owners-
sort of a Sodom and Gomorrah kind of thing.
188. See supra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
189. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(2) (1962).
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dering the managers themselves criminals. Perhaps most important, the statement
of the defense would give notice of what is expected of managers.9 ° and provide an
incentive for compliance. This incentive actually should be superior to the one
provided by a respondeat superior standard, in that conviction pursuant to respon-
deat superior casts no necessary aspersions on management conduct. It should also
be superior to any incentive provided by the current federal sentencing guide-
lines,'' insofar as it would be a complete defense and not left in any way to judicial
discretion.
It was suggested above that federal adoption of the MPC approach might be too
blunt a tool, in that it combines design and reference statutes, which arguably re-
flect different levels of true legislative intent.'92 An approach combining design,
reference and silence statutes surely is that much blunter. It does not, however, risk
under-inclusion to the same extent, in that burdens with respect to matters within
managerial knowledge are more properly placed. After all, so long as a triggering
event has occurred, it seems entirely appropriate to regard management as having
functioned incorrectly, unless there is a showing to the contrary. Requiring such a
showing is in no sense unduly harsh, given both the existing federal standard' and
the concession of the drafters of the MPC that it is acceptable to make manage-
ment's diligence a matter of defense.
Another criticism advanced with respect to the approach of the MPC was that it
was undesirable to deal with the issue of entity liability in the abstract. Without a
doubt, this is a criticism equally applying to the above-made defense proposal. It is
important to note, however, that the defense proposal is intended to be adopted in
tandem with a penalty proposal described below, and it is by reason of this penalty
proposal that contextualization may be improved.
In an attempt to apply the defense proposal in at least some contexts, however,
let us once again consider the Milberg Weiss situation. There, a showing that
Messrs. Bershad and/or Schulman had engaged in the alleged criminal conduct
would suffice to establish the first element. To the extent that the entity benefited
from lucrative attorney's fees received from the solicited class actions, a showing of
the second element also would seem to be readily forthcoming. It would then be-
come the obligation of Milberg Weiss to show that it had reasonable procedures in
effect to prevent wrongdoing. These presumably would include attorney training
programs, audits of accounts, and reporting systems, among other possibilities. Not
remarkably, these would be precisely the types of things that appear to be affirma-
tively required by the typical rules of professional responsibility governing lawyers,
190. Managers would be expected to lack negligence in all circumstances involving foreseeable federal
crime.
191. See supra notes 86-87.
192. See supra Part II.B.2.
193. The existing federal standard permits no showing on the matter until the penalty phase.
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of which all partners in Milberg Weiss certainly had reason to know.'9 4 Critically,
however, if prosecutors believed that the requisite safeguards were in place, they
would have been unlikely to bring the indictment, no matter what their other polit-
ical motivations might have been.
In the Arthur Andersen scenario, a single conviction of, or guilty plea by, any
employee (and there was one, count it, one such plea') would satisfy the first
element. To the extent that the plea related only to the destruction of evidence and
other acts obstructing justice after Enron's wheels had begun to come off, we would
need to face the question of whether Arthur Andersen did, or was intended to,
benefit. After all, the truth came out, and the obstructing employee may just have
been trying to save himself from individual prosecution. This sort of test-driving
suggests that we could avoid at least some questions by more careful definition in
the first place. If we were to specify that benefit to the entity is conclusively pre-
sumed if the bad-acting agent is not attempting to extract a benefit from the entity,
the bases might be well covered. When the (sports-metaphor-mixing) baton is
passed to the entity to establish its defense, it would need to show that it had the
well-designed and functioning training, reporting, and internal auditing programs
that we might expect from a then "big five" accounting firm. Whether Arthur An-
dersen did or did not might be something that the actual prosecutors took into
account in their charging decision; in any event, we do not know whether the de-
fense could have been established. If not, we would move to the penalty phase.
Before doing so, however, it is useful to posit a hypothetical involving a non-pro-
fessional entity (that is, neither an association of lawyers or public accountants).
Rather than tackling anything on the order of an imploding Enron, let us simply
consider a hypothetical corporation engaged in government contracting. We will
assume that one of its employees has engaged in unlawful bribery of government
officials for the purpose of obtaining contracts for the corporation. We then have
assumed ourselves a slam-dunk satisfaction of the above suggested elements. What
would the corporation have to show to establish a defense? Tests based on "reasona-
bleness"-be they of precautions or otherwise-tend to be rather more easily
stated than applied. Because the possibility of bribery is hardly esoteric, however, it
would seem that any such entity would be expected to have some system for check-
ing on cash or electronic disbursements to a list of government officials at agencies
with which the entity does business, as well as internal standards prohibiting the
use of corporate assets and employees for the private benefit of such officials. If
such a system and such standards in fact were in place, but a canny employee
managed to subvert them, so be it-the corporation nonetheless would go free. If it
did not have such a system and standards, it would be deemed criminally sanction-
able. This hypothetical thus moves us beyond any comfort zone associated with
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regulated professionals (although certainly entities bidding on government con-
tracts have a daunting array of specialized regulations with which to comply), and
it really does not feel so bad. Whether we really could muster the public will to
announce in general terms that organizational failure has formal consequences in
criminal law might depend, then, only on how skillfully we can address concerns
about penalties.
3. The Possibility of "Untriggered" Entity Crime
Before turning to the question of sanctions, it must be acknowledged that the fore-
going discussion comes perilously close to constituting a call for a crime-let's call
it "entity indifference"-that does not include the trigger of some other criminal
wrongdoing, but simply comprises an assessment that an entity does not have in
place a system of controls deemed abstractly adequate. Stepping over the brink to
discuss such a call, it would seem, at a minimum, to have the advantage of leveling
playing fields (perhaps the ones where batons are passed?) between those entities
that lack adequate controls, but coincidentally lack employees with criminal incli-
nations, and those entities without adequate controls, but with bad luck in hiring.
It has the disadvantage of abstraction, and obviously would impose significant costs
on entities, and perhaps ridiculously high costs on regulators, were enforcement to
be taken seriously.
At this point, it becomes quite relevant to contemplate the reporting and inter-
nal-control assessment requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.'
These requirements appear to be an excellent example of abstract indifference con-
trols in the specific context of financial reporting. Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley
requires that annual reports under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 ("'34 Act") contain "internal control reports,"' 97 and section 906
requires an entity's chief executive officer and chief financial officer to certify that
the entity's reports under those two sections comply with all requirements. 98 Both
knowingly and willfully inaccurate certifications are criminalized, with the latter
suffering higher penalties than the former.199 More generally, willful violations of
the '34 Act are criminal.2" The controversy over the alleged costs and the alleged
difficulty of implementing the internal controls requirements is educational, and
certainly signals caution with respect to broader non-indifference mandates.2"'
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the certification crimes just described are
196. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
197. Id. § 404; see also Management's Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certifica-
tion of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, 274 (2003) (SEC
Rule discussing internal control reports), available at http://wwwsec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm.
198. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350).
199. Id.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2000).
201. See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of "Going Private,"
55 EMOttY L.J. 141 (2006); James D. Cox, The Role of Empirical Evidence in Evaluating the Wisdom of the
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individual in nature. From this standpoint, Congress may have gotten it just right
or just wrong as far as attracting management attention is concerned; had the
crime been a matter of entity liability for lacking controls, the issues might have
played out differently.
Signaling caution, moreover, is not the same thing as putting on the brakes en-
tirely. Suppose, for instance, that all entities of a certain size (say all that are re-
quired to be registered under the '34 Act) or of a certain type (say all law firms
seeking to appear before the SEC) were required to establish committees responsi-
ble for considering and implementing procedures relating to a specified list of is-
sues as to which we fear insufficient attention. At a minimum, this list would
include constituent and composite crime, and might eventually extend to such
matters as exploitation of children, contribution to global warming, etc. Failure to
have such a committee would be a crime itself; proof by the entity that it had such a
committee and that it was functioning reasonably well (whatever that might mean)
could be made a defense to assertions of entity liability in the context of "triggered"
crimes.
In justification of the idea of an "untriggered" crime of entity indifference, it is
relevant to rebut the notion that the prospect of civil liability adequately takes care
of all, or even most, instances of managerial malfeasance. Certainly, individual
managers have little to fear from the civil side; there has been a virtual landslide of
state legislation permitting the elimination of private monetary civil liability for
managers themselves.2"2 Although entities themselves may be liable on a respondeat
superior basis for harming third parties, a remedy only follows if such harms actu-
ally materialize. This means that there may be many instances in which managerial
indifference (or worse) with respect to the risk of such harms may go unnoticed,
even where harm is completely foreseeable." 3
As far as civil enforcement by a government agency is concerned, there also will
be noticeable gaps. First, any such agency will usually and understandably be more
attentive to instances of actual harm. Second, the areas in which such agencies may
be involved tend to be quite specific (i.e., securities regulation, banking regulation,
etc.), meaning that there is a significant realm in which management may be negli-
gent with respect to the possibility of injuries to third parties without any civil
reckoning whatsoever.
How likely is it that an untriggered crime of entity indifference might be im-
posed? A lesson is suggested by the hue and cry about the Sarbanes-Oxley internal
reporting requirements just described, although those did (as noted) pose the spec-
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 823 (2006); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
202. See HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 42, at 699.
203. In addition, such matters as foreseeable loss of employee life may be completely, and regrettably,
monetarized. This appears to be an intractable problem with any liability scheme based primarily on monetary
penalties.
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ter of individual liability. More educational, perhaps, are the somewhat lily-livered
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley that force an entity's disclosure of the existence or
absence of corporate ethics codes, without requiring such codes," 4 as well as disclo-
sure of whether the corporation does or does not have financial experts on the
audit committee, without requiring such experts."0 ' One suspects, especially in light
of the subsequent heated commentary about the extension of the federal nose
under the state tent of internal affairs, that the drafters of Sarbanes-Oxley regarded
actually requiring ethics committees and financial experts to be too controversial
an involvement in matters of corporate governance. More generally criminalizing
lack of corporate controls presumably would be regarded as even worse-unless,
perhaps, the penalty were appropriately moderated.
4. Fitting the Crime
As previously mentioned, whenever criminal entity liability is discussed, there is a
predictable response of head-shaking over whether the penalty is necessary, given
civil liability (the "necessity" concern). This head-shaking can be quite violent if the
duplication is also seen as a matter of economic over-deterrence. The shaking is
accompanied by the second predictable response, which is chanting about the suf-
fering of the innocent (the "poor innocents" concern). Both of these concerns can
be addressed by appropriate tailoring of the penalty for entity crime, whether it is
of the triggered or untriggered variety.
a. The Necessity Concern
The necessity concern logically depends, of course, on whether the criminal law
penalty merely duplicates civil penalties. To the extent that civil penalties are pri-
marily monetary, and given that the usual (and feasible) criminal penalties against
entities are monetary, overlap necessarily exists. This does not mean, however, that
the overlap need be complete.
i. Limitation of Monetary Penalties
To the extent that monetary criminal penalties are regarded as duplicative, and thus
not only unnecessary, but perhaps posing a risk of economic over-deterrence, the
obvious thing to do is to limit their size. Suppose, then, that the criminal penalty to
be assessed against an entity was to be limited to disgorgement of all profits in
excess of some industry average. Ideally, the calculation would be made after the
204. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 406, 116 Stat. 745, 789-90 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7264).
205. Id. § 407. Contrast these with the bold (this is sarcasm) move taken by Congress in that self-same Act
in criminalizing securities fraud! Id. § 807. (This is a real and rare Dave Barry moment as far as law review
articles are concerned). See generally Douglas M. Branson, Too Many Bells? Too Many Whistles? Corporate
Governance in the Post-Enron, Post-WorldCom Era, 58 S.C. L. REV. 65 (2006) (generally discussing and criticiz-
ing the various provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley).
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settlement of civil liability. If civil liability only later materialized, a refund could be
allowed. Such a limitation presumably would avoid any truly hideous over-deter-
rence effects, as well as have the favorable effect of discouraging management from
turning a blind eye toward constituent wrongdoing, which it might do if permitted
to reason that whatever civil liability were to result, it would be outweighed by
enhanced firm profitability. It is true that this incentive would be diminished in the
case of an entity that otherwise does not expect to exceed industry standards of
profitability, as well as in the situation of an entity that participates in a universally
mismanaged industry-but nothing is perfect.
Interestingly and enticingly, one can imagine distinct market benefits generally
attending the adoption of a system criminalizing entity indifference and penalizing
the entity with disgorgement of all profits in excess of the industry average. In these
circumstances, unless an organization generally was able to signal that it had a
substantially effective program for avoiding entity indifference, it would not be
rational for the market ever to place a value on the entities' ownership interests
based on anything other than a projection of earnings at or below the industry
average. This would tend to prevent irrational speculation in those interests, °6 as
well as give a significant incentive for implementing programs for avoiding
indifference.
It is, once again, useful to test the proposal in at least one fact-based context. As
it turns out, in implementing a profit-limited penalty against our friends at Milberg
Weiss, we would encounter complications attendant to owner participation in the
enterprise. How does one measure profitability in such a circumstance? Presuma-
bly, some fair quantum meruit-based compensation would need to be permitted
before considering the firm's ultimate profitability. Nonetheless, the exercise points
out once again the necessity of testing proposals in a variety of contexts for pur-
poses of fine-tuning before implementation.
ii. The Strength of Names: "Bad Corporation, No... What?"
Another possible response to the necessity concern would be to eliminate entirely
all monetary criminal penalties against entities. Thus, the only penalty associated
with criminal entity liability would be the conviction itself. If branding of this sort
were to become more commonplace, we still might take pride in what we had
achieved. Public willingness to take a stand on the desire to have consistently non-
moribund management presumably could carry an important message with a pow-
erful ability to shape corporate and other market culture.
There is, however, a counter-consideration that also is powerful. One might fear
either that prosecutors would not bother to charge or that the strength of public
206. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and the Regulation of
Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225, 235-36 (2001) (discussing systemic dangers of speculation);
see also ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 118-32 (2000) (same).
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censure alone might fade when compared to the costs of mounting a defense. If this
were the case, entities might automatically plead guilty to a charge of entity indif-
ference. In either event (that is, if charging became even rarer or being a convict
became truly commonplace), the threat of liability presumably would lose a great
deal of its exhortational value.
It is to be hoped that neither phenomenon would occur. To the extent that a
conviction (or, for that matter, an indictment) would call market attention to an
entity's organizational hygiene (and the prospect of civil liability), at least some
market sanction might be expected. Similarly, at least some response by prospective
trading partners warned of organizational proclivities should be foreseen. In the
interest of avoiding an adverse market or business reaction, then, an entity's man-
agers might be expected both to avoid indifference and to contest its charge. Simi-
larly, a rational prosecutor might easily find the bringing of charges worthwhile.
It admittedly is difficult to predict exactly how market or other business reaction
to the shame of criminalization might affect overall firm value. Examining the re-
cent experiences of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. ("Martha Stewart,
Inc.") and Arthur Andersen provides inconclusive and possibly contradictory
results.
There was, of course, no charge of entity liability involved in Martha Stewart's
criminal prosecution. Still, one is inclined to take the market's reaction to her con-
viction as some sort of surrogate for reaction to the criminal conviction of her
eponymous corporation. We know that after a brief period of decline, the shares of
the organization rebounded when it became clear that Ms. Stewart and her genteel
sensibilities would be rejoining the company (perhaps providing an analogy to an
entity conviction that does not lead to replacement of theretofore successful man-
agement)." 7 Although the popularity of the enterprise's products seems to have
declined, it is impossible to say how much of the decline simply is attributable to
normal cycling of fashion tastes. In any event, it is clear that Martha Stewart, Inc.
did not die of shame.
Arthur Andersen, obviously, suffered a different outcome. The defection of its
partners may be viewed as a rational market reaction to anticipated civil liability
and loss of prospective business. This loss of business was, in part, the result of the
warning given to Arthur Andersen's clients. More important, perhaps, the firm's
criminal difficulties led more-or-less automatically to loss of its ability to represent
clients before the SEC. 8
As a minimum attempt to limit outright deaths from shame, the dangers associ-
ated with disqualification of the sort suffered by Andersen should be dealt with. It
207. See Martha Stewart Returns to Work, Mar. 7, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7078053/; see also
Corporatelnformation, Martha Stewart Living Oninimedia, Inc., Company Snapshot, Mar. 3, 2007, http://www.
corporateinformation.com/snapshot.asp?SentBy-home&cusip=573083102 (demonstrating that the company's
earnings have increased since Martha Stewart's return in 2005).
208. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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would be relatively simple for any statute generally addressing entity crime (includ-
ing one creating a crime of entity indifference) to specify that conviction is to have
no automatic disqualifying effect with respect to any government-administered re-
gime. Stating that government disqualification practices are to be modeled after
those generally employed for government contracting purposes (where disqualifi-
cation is left to the discretion of designated officials) might fit the bill nicely." 9
b. The Poor Innocents Concern
i. Rethinking the Claim to Innocence
As repeatedly alluded to above, penalties assessed against entities have the effect of
diminishing their value, and thus the wealth of their owners.21 Spillover effects on
employees, consumers, creditors and others also are quite predictable. Although
regarded as objectionable by some on the grounds that many of those affected will
not bear any responsibility for the wrongdoing and may not even have been associ-
ated with the entity at the time the wrongdoing occurred, 1' penalizing entities-
particularly those that are publicly held-does give the market some incentive to
pay attention to whether wrongdoing has been, or is likely to be, committed by a
particular entity. One thus would not be surprised to see the market value of own-
ership interests declining well in excess of the amount of any penalty imposed.
Contrariwise, if an entity could offer credible assurances to the market that wrong-
doing is less likely to occur there than at similarly situated entities, its ownership
interests rationally would command a relatively higher price vis a vis those other
entities. In a way, this tells us (albeit formalistically) that people who buy interests
in non-assuring entities have gotten what they paid for. This parlays nicely (but
only formalistically) into an assertion that, just as there are no innocent partners in
law firms that lack adequate controls, there might be no innocent shareholders if a
new regime were implemented and prospective shareholders were adequately
warned.
The formalism of the argument is disturbing and, in the light of day, not partic-
ularly convincing. Reminiscent of one of the stepsisters in a non-Disney version of
Cinderella, it lops off all the realistic toes that cannot be crammed into the glass
slipper. Carried to its logical extremes, even employees, clients, and customers
could lose their claim of innocence. As to all of these, limits (as described above)
209. For good descriptions of the government contracting debarment process, see James J. McCullough &
Abram J. Pafford, Government Contract Suspension and Debarment-What Every Contractor Needs to Know, 45
GOVT CONTRACTOR 5 465 (2003); Brian D. Shannon, Debarment and Suspension Revisited: Fewer Eggs in the
Basket?, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 363 (1995).
210. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 401 (1981) (noting the effect ofcotporate punishment
on innocent shareholders).
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with respect to penalties and disqualifications seem to be a necessary minimum
protection.
ii. Limiting Penalties and Deaths from Shame
Thus, the response to the poor innocents concern is virtually congruent with the
response to the necessity concern. If the monetary criminal penalty assessed against
an entity simply were to be disgorgement of all profits in excess of some industry
average, bag-holding shareholders would not be drastically penalized by the penalty
itself. This would be even truer were monetary penalties eliminated entirely. More-
over, adverse effects on employees and customers should be distinctly moderated,
although not obliterated. To the extent that automatic disqualification issues also
could be addressed, much more comfort should be achieved for all concerned.
Although it was posited above that market and business reactions would transpire
in response to the warning given by criminal branding, it is difficult to criticize
their rationality. Their effect on innocents is lamentable, but no more lamentable
than civil liability or mere bad luck. This is particularly true to the extent that they
represent an attempt to limit subsequent, more severe harms.
VI. CONCLUSION: MORE CRIME, LESS PUNISHMENT
Dealing with the question of entity liability in abstraction is fraught with risk (to
say nothing of boredom). The starting-point invocation of the experience of Mil-
berg Weiss was intended to provide a context that is timely and interesting. Conclu-
sions that seem reasonable in that context may themselves be contextually limited.
Thus, an attempt was made to recognize that arguments about the unindicted part-
ners' lack of innocence no more than formally translate into arguments about the
unclean hands of other types of owners of other types of entities. This recognition
probably constitutes an acknowledgment that criminal entity liability in the Mil-
berg Weiss context could be one of its better uses. Given the lack of clarity in
existing federal law, however, it is difficult to know.
The foregoing parts of this article thus made the claim that the law of federal
criminal entity liability requires reworking. Part IV suggested that the goal of influ-
encing management structure and practice, and the goal of public warning, should
be specifically identified and made the centerpiece of the federal criminal entity
regime. In furtherance of these goals, Part V advanced a proposal with respect to
clarifying the elements and defenses of entity liability triggered by constituent
wrongdoing, partly in the belief that this clarification might lead to more frequent
invocation. Part V also proposed an untriggered crime of entity indifference. As far
as sanctions are concerned, Part V called for limiting monetary penalties assessed
against entities by reference to supernormal profits, or, in the alternative, for elimi-
nating monetary penalties entirely. It also addressed automatic disqualification
sanctions, and suggested that they be eliminated.
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The article's overall bottom line accordingly might be summarized as "more
crime and less punishment." ' The greatest problem with this philosophy might
well be a perception that if the stakes of entity liability were not relatively high,
prosecutors would not bother to indict, and/or entities would not bother to resist.
To the extent that punishment is reconceived as a thing meted out by the public,
whom prosecutors have a duty to warn, this problem does not seem to be extreme.
At the close of the day, then, it is worth recognizing that it is contextualized public
reaction that may constitute an entity's most appropriate punishment, whether
known as "shame" or otherwise. Whether the punishment ultimately is fatal is thus
for no single human to decide.
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212. It thus is in direct opposition to the call of Professor Mann, supra note 133, and is not well aligned
with the views of Professor Coffee expressed in Blurring, supra note 135.
